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A model of search of an area is developed using the proba-
bility of detection as the measure of effectiveness. The
area is partitioned into two pieces. Two search units, with
different capabilities, attempt to detect one evader. If the
search efforts of the two units do not overlap, the probability
of detection is the same no matter how the area is partitioned.
An approach based upon Game theory is also developed. The
variance of the probability of detection is computed and
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I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout history, searching, on one form or another
has been one of man's constant endeavors. Prehistoric man
hunted for his food, both plant and animal. The more
successful searchers understood the characteristics of their
quary and search area. They could then eliminate some areas
from consideration and concentrate en others. For example,
if certain plants only grew in the shade, open fields would
be eliminated from the search area.
In searches involving people, this characteristic infor-
mation can be exploited by both the searcher and his quary
(the evader) . If the evader knows the tendencies of the
searcher, he can take the appropriate actions to reduce his
chances of being found. The knowledge of an adversary's
action (intelligence in military terms) is always sought to
give one side an advantage. Certainly the submarine commander
wants to know where the convoy will transit, just as much as
the convoy commander wants to know where the submarine will
hunt [Ref. 1].
We can see that to fall into patterns of searching (or
evading) is analogous to providing the other party with
information that he can exploit. Since a pattern or deter-
minant strategy provides information to the adversary, it is
only logical not to be predictable. Therefore, the searcher
and evader should be unpredictable, or random, in their choice
8

of search actions. Search patterns that are random do not
yield repeatable results from each trial but certain quanti-
ties such as the probability of detection are amenable to
mathematical calculation.
Each time the searcher faces a choice with a known set
of conditions, he should choose his action randomly to avoid
falling into a pattern. If the search action was repeatable,
the same choice would be repeated each time and hence a
pattern would develop.
A prime quantity of interest in a search is the probability
of detection (POD) . The probability of detection is a measure
of effectiveness (MOE) of the search. The basic problem is
to compute this MOE. The next step is usually to optimize
the probability of detection. Optimize means maximize to
the searcher and minimize to the evader. Occasionally other
pieces of information are required such as the probability of
detection under an extreme, or most probable, set of conditions,
This paper will explore the problem of one or more search-
ing units searching for a single evader. It is assumed that
neither party has tendencies that may be exploited by the
other to predict his actions . The actions of the searcher
and evader are random in that actions or choices are not
predictable
.
A border search problem will be developed initially. The
probability of detection is defined and a cookie cutter model
is introduced. The searcher has two search units with

different capabilities attempting to detect a single evader.
Following this, a more complex problem is addressed. Two
search units of different capabilities attempt to detect a
single evader in an area which is partitioned into two pieces.
The area search problem is then addressed as a two person
zero sum game. Each entry in the payoff matrix is the proba-
bility of the searcher detecting the evader for the strategies
picked by each player. The optimal probabilities of playing
each strategy are computed. The expected value results of
the game indicate that all pairs of search strategies yield
the same expected value of the game. The choice of strategies
is made based upon minimum variance. The search area is
then partitioned into three pieces and an example is presented
The concept of random search is next introduced. The
evader is allowed the latitude of moving within the operating
areas. The problem is modeled as a game and the expectation
and variance are computed. In the case of random search, the
pair of strategies of the searcher which yield the largest
expected value of the game would be chosen for the search.
10

II. THE NATURE OF THE SEARCH PROBLEM
Search units are generally constrained by range, speed,
endurance or other restrictions such as hours of daylight
available. The time and speed constraints can be combined
into an effective range of the searching unit. If there are
two units available to search a region, it is logical to want
to find the best way to partition the region to optimize the
search. Two partitioning problems will be addressed in this
section. The first is the search of a border. The second
problem is that of searching an area. Under certain conditions
and constraints, the area searching problem can be reduced
to the same mathematical form as the border, or line searching
problem.
A. BORDER SEARCHING PROBLEM
We consider the problem of insurgents or smugglers attempt-
ing to cross a border such as a river or an international
boundary. The border must not necessarily be straight but
we require that it does not have extreme curvature or corners.
We define the person, or unit, attempting to cross the border,
as the evader . Let the patrolling perscn, or unit, be defined
as the searcher. We will assume that the border is very long
Range = Average Speed X Endurance
11

so that at any time the searcher cannot observe the entire
length of the border.
The objective of the evader is to cross the border with-
out being detected by the searcher. The searcher's objective
is to detect the evader when he attempts to cross the border.
A detection can only occur when the evader appears in the
field of view of the searcher's sensor. The sensors could be
acoustic (sonar) , electromagnetic (radar) , or optical (infra-
red or image enhancing devices) . Of course, the human eye
is the sensor we are all most familiar with.
The searcher and the evader have diametrically opposed
views of success and failure. The searcher considers the
detection of the evader a success while the evader calls it
a failure. If the evader is not detected, he considers that
a success, while the searcher considers it to be a failure.
The searcher and evader can both observe the same set of
events and reach opposite conclusions about success and
failure.
Consider the following model of the border search problem
in Figure 1. This model is applicable while the searcher is
actively on station searching for evaders crossing the border.
The evader is attempting to cross the border into friendly
territory. The probability of detection is 1.0 if the evader
passes within the sweep width W, otherwise it is 0.0. It is
The towers of the great wall of China were constructed
so the entire length of the border could be viewed simul-




V = Searcher Speed
U = Evader Speed







Figure 1. Model of 3order Search
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assumed that the border length S is much greater than the
sweepwidth W. The searcher travels at speed V along the
border. The evader is equally likely to cross anywhere
along the length of the border. The searcher traverses the
border in one direction for the duration of his endurance.
It is necessary to state some further assumptions and
consequences of the model. We assume that the searcher has
a much greater sweepwidth than the counterdetection range
of the evader. Therefore, no evasive action may be taken by
the evader. In addition there can be no missed detections
or false alarms. The evader can only be detected when he
falls within the sweepwidth of the searcher's sensors.
The evader approaches the border at speed U, and at an
angle, 9. The searcher travels at speed V along the border.
We choose an orthogonal coordinate system, perpendicular
(Jj and parallel (//) to the border (see Figure 2) and resolve
the speed of the searcher and evader into components in this
coordinate system.
When the evader crosses the border, he must travel the
distance L = W/cos 9, in which he is subject to detection.




L cos o j_ »
U
We see in Equation (1) that only the velocity component



















Figure 2. Evader Attenuating to Cross Border
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time to traverse the sweep width band. It is apparent that
the evader should not be exposed to possible detection any
longer than necessary. The evader does not know the searcher's
direction of travel along S. The speed component U should
be as large as possible to minimize the time to cross the
border. This occurs when the evader crosses perpendicular
to the border. Under these conditions 6=0, U, = U and
U.j =0. In all subsequent developments, the evader will
cross the border in the most advantageous manner, i.e.,
perpendicular to the border.
The searcher is not allowed to cover a portion of the
border that he has already traversed, and only travels in
one direction. However, he may come to the end of the border
before he has exhausted his search time. We can prevent this
from happening by requiring that the searcher always begin
his search at least VT + W/2 from either end of the border.
If he moves toward the end of the border for time T at speed
V, he is still W/2 away from the end when he finishes the
search, where W/2 is the search radius.
The measure of effectiveness in this problem has been
chosen to be the probability of detecting the evader. It
may be possible to determine the probability of detection
experimentally. The initial conditions of a search would
be determined for the searcher and the evader. The evader
would select from a uniform distribution, a point where to
attempt to cross the border. The searcher would select from
16

a uniform distribution, where to start his search within the
interval VT + W/2 from each end of the border. Then with a
flip of a fair coin, he would decide which direction in which
to traverse the border. A series of these trials would be
conducted and the number of detections would be recorded.
The probability of detection would be estimated from the
ratio of the number of detections to the number of trials.
The above procedure could be accomplished more easily in a
simulation than in a physical experiment. A more appealing
alternative is to compute the probability of detection directly
For a given evader's speed U, the effectiveness of the
searcher is a function of his speed V, the sensor sweepwidth
W and the border length S. The probability of detection is
only defined if the evader is present. The search speed,
sweepwidth and length of border alone are not enough to de-
fine the probability of detection, though some information
is available by taking the ratio of sweepwidth and border
length. This coverage factor, W/S , is one measure of the
searcher's capability.
If the searcher could traverse the entire border during
the increment of time that the evader was attempting the
crossing, the evader would surely be detected. If the
searcher were stationary, the evader would certainly not be
detected unless he crossed the border in the field of view
of the stationary sensor of the searcher. In the first case,
the probability of detection is 1.0 and in the second case,
17

it is equal to the coverage factor, W/S. In the problem
under consideration, some part of the total length of the
border is traversed by the searcher during the time that it
takes the evader to make his crossing. The probability of
detection is defined to be the ratio of the length of the
border searched, R (in the time interval, t, that it takes
the evader to cross the border) , to the length of the border,
S. This is the probability of detection given the evader is
crossing the border S, i.e., POD j S . Here,
pod|s = | = 5Li^t _ w v*w/o t (2)
where U > , V > .
Rearranging terms, the following expression for the proba-
bility of detection results:
POD|S = | x (1 + ~) , (3)
where U > , V > .
In Equation (3) , W/S is the coverage factor. Consider
the example where the searcher's speed is V = 0, such as
when he occupies a watch tower on the border. If the evader
crosses within his field of view, W, he is detected. Even
with no speed, there still would be a finite POD. The ratio
of speeds in the second term represents the increase in the
probability of detection due to the speed of the searcher.
18

This ratio , V/U, may be interpreted as the dynamic enhance-
ment of the static probability of detection [Ref. 2].
We will now determine the upper bound on the PODJS.
Figure 3 shows the allowable interval in which the searcher
may begin his search.
- VT+W/2*p Interval to start search *[*- VT+W/2
Border Length S
Figure 3. Interval to Start Search
During the interval t that the evader is crossing the
border,












1 > W + s' or




P0D|S = |(1 + §) ,
we have
i > |a + ^) > fa + gi.
and
POD|S < 1.
If we examine the probability of detection (Equations 2
and 3) we may confirm some intuitive ideas about searching.
The POD is greater if the searcher can see farther (greater
sweepwidth, W) or cover more ground in a given time (greater
speed, V) . The probability of detection is less if the
evader can cross the border more quickly (greater speed, U)
or operate along an expanded border (i.e., increased S)
.
3. TWO SEARCHING UNITS ON THE BORDER
In this section we will assume that there are two searchers,
Unit 1 and Unit 2 searching for a single evader crossing the
border. Each search unit has a different sweepwidth (W, and
W
2 )
and speed (V\ and V~) • The speed of the evader is U.
The ranges, R, and R
2
that represent the search capability of
20















These equations are of the same form as the numerator in
Equation (2) .
It is reasonable to have some rationale for the division
of labor between the two searching units. Suppose that we
partition the border length, S, into two pieces of lengths
S, and S~, where S, + S~ = S. We assign Unit 1 to the length
of border S, and Unit 2 to length of border S~, as shown in
Figure 4.
The probabilities of detection of Unit 1 and Unit 2 (in
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P(S.) = Probability the evader will cross the
border in segment S., i = 1,2.
Since the evader is assumed to be equally likely to
cross the border anywhere along its length,
S .
P(S.) = —— . (9)
Now, reducing Equation (8) using Equations (7) and (9) gives




= R = the total non-overlapping length of
the border patrolled by the two
search units
.
The implicit idea in partitioning the border was to do
it in such a way that the probability of detection was opti-
mized. We see from the form of Equation (10) that the par-
titioning of the border into two individual segments has no
effect on the overall probability of detection. This is the
result of the evader being equally likely to cross the border
at any point along its length, and of not allowing any overlap
by the search units.
23

C. TWO SEARCHING UNITS IN AN AREA
The next logical extension of the searching problem is
to search an area instead of a border. We will consider two
search units in an area, searching for an evader who is
operating at a fixed location. If the area swept by a
search unit's sensor contains the evader, there is a detection,
Otherwise there is not.
The following information describes the capabilities and
constraints of a searching unit:
V = Search speed,
T = Searching time,
W = Sweepwidth (POD of the evader = 1.0 within
W, zero otherwise) , and
ttW
a = Area searched = WVT + —j— (in time T) .
In Figure 5 we see that the area swept (searched) in a
time interval T by the searcher, consists of displacing the
initial sweepwidth circle a distance VT. If the search time,
W TT
T, is sufficiently large such that WVT >>
—r-, then the area,
a, can be approximated by:
a : WVT. (12)
We have assumed that the evader is operating at a specific
location, such as a field headquarters, within an area, A.
He will remain at this location, and cannot move to avoid
the searcher. We continue to invoke the principle of
24

randomness. This means that the searcher does not know
where to search for the evader nor does the evader know where
VT
W = Sweepwidth
V = Searcher ' s Speed
T = Time Searching
Figure 5. Total Area Searched
the searching units will look for him. Further, we assume
that the evader is equally likely to be anywhere within the
area when the search is initiated and the searcher is equally
likely to begin searching at any point within the area. The
searcher then begins the search with the objective of detect-
ing the evader.
The measure of effectiveness of the searcher is the proba-
bility of detection, POD. The searcher would like to exhaus-
tively cover the whole area and if he did the POD would be
1.0. Otherwise the POD is the ratio of the area searched,
a, to the total area A, or
PODJA = |. (13)
25

Figure 6 shows a rectangular area, A = hS , which may
contain the evader and the area a covered by a searching unit
Area of Search: A = hS




U~- ^ VT Evader
•
h
Figure 6. Rectangular Search Area
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An area searching problem involves two dimensions. Under
some circumstances, we can fix one dimension of the rectangle
and only have the other one variable. For example, if we
were searching for an airplane that flew over water along
a track ten miles from the coast, we may search out to sea
as far as twenty miles along some length of coastline. Thus,
we have fixed one side of our search rectangle but the other
dimension, along the Coast, would still be chosen to reflect
realistic bounds on the problem. We now substitute the total
search area hS , for A, into Equation (13), which yields:
POD | A = ~ (14)
The term r- is a constant. Now, if we compare Equation
(14) with Equation (4) , for the one dimensional border search
problem we see that the mathematical form is the same.
Now, we will expand the problem to two searchers. Two
searchers, Unit 1 and Unit 2, with different sweepwidths
,




a. = W.V.t. , i = 1,2. (15)
l ill
The two swept areas a, and a„ are not allowed to overlap,
and of course must be within the overall search area, A. The
search area, A, is partitioned into two parts, one of size
27

A, searched by Unit 1 and the other of size A, searched by
Unit 2, so that
A = A-,^ + A
2
. (16)
It is assumed that the evader is equally likely to be
at any point in the search area. Therefore, the total proba-
bility of detecting the evader is:
p(Det
»
- jq4-^ ' I- < 17 »
where
:
a-, + a~ = a, the total area swept out by both
search units.
The conclusion in the area search is analogous to the
border search; the probability of detection is not affected
by the partitioning of the search area.
We have found for this problem that there is no way to
partition the search area and improve the probability of
detection. The POD can be degraded but not improved. In
the next section, we shall model the search as a game and
exploit the fact that the searcher and the evader have con-
flicting goals.
By overlapping search areas
28

III. MODELING THE SEARCH AS A GAME
Up to now, the information that we have obtained is that
the probability of detecting the evader is (a,+a~)/A
regardless of how the searcher chooses to allocate the two
searching units. We will now expand the problem to allow the
searcher and the evader alternative courses of action. The
partitioning of A will define a choice for the evader. He must
choose to locate in either A, or A2 , and thus the evader has
only these two choices, to operate (hide) in A, or A . The
partitioning of the search area also provides the searcher
with alternative courses of action on how he allocates his
resources
.
The theory of games is useful in analyzing conflicts be-
tween opposing parties [Refs. 3,4]. The two players in this
game are the searcher and the evader. The conflict is that
the searcher wants the probability of detecting the evader
to be high while the evader wants it to be low.
A game matrix is constructed from the outcomes of all
possible courses of action of the two players. We have assumed
that the searcher partitions the search area, A, into two
pieces A-, and A
2
. We will further assume that this parti-
tioning is known to the evader. This does not impart any
information to the evader about the searcher's course of
Providing there is no overlap of search areas
29

action, i.e., the area in which he will search. The only
restriction on the partitioning of A is that each of the
two pieces, A-, and A~ , be at least as large as the sum of
the search capabilities, a, and a
2 ,
of the two searching units
The searcher has several ways that he can allocate his two
search units to the operating areas. The four alternatives
of the searcher that involve both searching units are pre-
sented in Table 1 below. The entries in the matrix identify
which search units operate in each of the two areas, A, and
v
TABLE 1. POSSIBLE STRATEGIES OF THE SEARCHER
Searcher
Strategy
Unit 1 Unit 2
Unit 2 Unit 1
Units 1 & 2 None
None Units 1 & 2














Locate in A~ (Not A
x
)
This situation may be treated as a two-person zero-sum game
characterized by a payoff matrix which specifies the results
of all possible combinations of the strategies of both players
In our case, the entries in the payoff matrix are the proba-
bilities of detection of the evader by the searcher. For
example, if the evader hid in A~ (Strategy 2) and the searcher
chose his strategy S, (where Unit 2 searches A~ and Unit 1
searches in A, ) , the probability of detecting the evader
would be a~/A, . If the evader chose his strategy E~ and the
searcher chose his strategy S,, the probability of detection
would be (a-,+a-)/A
2
. In game theory, it is conventional to
present the payoff matrix with favorable payoff to the row
player. The probability of detection is a measure of success
of the searcher. Therefore, the searcher will be the row
player and the evader will be the column player. The payoff
matrix for the game is presented below in Table 3. It is
useful to establish a hierarchy of the payoff quantities.
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We will call the more capable search unit, Unit 1. This
means that Unit 1 sweeps more area than Unit 2 during the
search, i.e., a-, > a~ . We will call the larger of the two
search areas A,, i.e., A, > A- • We lose no generality with
these assumptions.
We will examine the case when a, /A, > a^/A^ in detail.
The second case, when a, /A, < a 2 /A 9 may be analyzed similarly
It is convenient to replace the entries in payoff matrix
(Table 3) with the symbols in Table 4 below. This will be
useful later when we analyze the game.
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Since a, > a_ ; a > y and 5 > 3
Since A, > A
2 ;
5 > a and 3 > y.
This yields the following hierarchy, 5 > a > 3 > Y- Also
since 5 > ct and 3>Y'*3 + S>a + Y-
Therefore,
























unknown, but as we will see later that it does
not affect the outcome of the evaluation of the game.
We will now consider two examples. The dimensions would
be chosen to be the same (e.g., sq. kilometers) . They will
cancel out of the equations for the probability of detection.
The important point in the examples that follow are the rela-
tive sizes of the area to be searched and the available
ability to search.
Example 1. Two search units searching for one evader where,
A = 100, A
1
= 60, and A
2
= 40;















and — > ^-.


























Note that 6 > ct+y in the matrix, i.e., w > ttt* It is more
convenient to deal with a matrix of integers than fractions
Therefore we multiply each entry by 24. This scales the





















. Two search units searching for one evader
where
,
A = 2 70, A
1
= 150, and A
2
= 120;
a = 100, a
l




l a ?Again, note that a. > a„ , A, > A and ~ > ^=-.

















We see here that 5 < a+y, i.e., jj-~- < ycTr- The hierarchy
of o and a+y are reversed in these two examples. When we
solve the games, we will see that it does not affect the
outcome since the order of all of the other parameters has
been established.
We multiply all of the entries in the matrix by 30 to



















We will evaluate the game according to the minimax
theorem. This dictates the manner in which both the searcher
and the evader must choose their strategies and the value of
the game that results from these choices. The details of
evaluating a game subject to the conditions of the minimax
theorem are presented in Appendix A.
At this point, we may solve the 4x2 game in Tables 3 and
4. An analytic solution is preferred but is not possible in
an Mx2 game (where M > 2) . We can solve the underlying 2x2
games analytically. For the Mx2 game, we would resort to a
graphical solution. This requires that the entries in the
payoff matrix are specified numerically or at least the
hierarchy of the elements is established. The examples are
plotted in Figure 7 as a function of the evader's strategies.
For either game, we can see in Figure 7 that the four strate-











Fiaure 7. ExamDles of 4 X 2 Games
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general 4x2 game would have six intersections of the strate-
gies (4 things taken 2 at a time). There are only two inde-
pendent strategies, defined by a, 3, y and 6. The other two
strategies can be constructed from the first two by elementary
matrix operations. This is shown in Appendix C.
The intersection of all four strategies of the searcher
are at the same point. This is the value of the game which
is (a, +a
2 )
/(A, +A~) , as expected.
The probability of detection computed as the value of
the game is the same as computed previously by taking the
ratio of areas. The searcher could choose any of his four
pairs of strategies 1-2, 1-4, 2-3 and 3-4. If he plays the
strategies optimally, he would achieve a probability of
detection equal to (a,+a
2 ) / (A, +A-)
.
All six subgames are analyzed in Appendix 3. Two of the
games have saddlepoints . The optimal strategies of the
searcher and evader are computed for the remaining four games.
Any single search is a Bernoulli trial which results in either
a success or a failure. When both players choose their
strategies optimally, the expected value cf the probability
of detection is the value of the game.
It is shown in Appendix B that the value of the games
are the same. We can see from the grpahical display of the
game, Figure 7, that some pairs of strategies range over more
extreme values than others. Compare the pair of Strategies
1 and 2 with 3 and 4. We see that there is more potential for
39

fluctuation of the results in 3 and 4 where the values may
possibly range from zero to 3 + 6. The game with Strategies
1 and 2, on the other hand, has a smaller range of possible
values, from y to 6
.
We have four 2x2 games with the same value. In accordance
with the expectation-variance principle of choice for deci-
sions, the choice of which set of strategies to use for
searching should be based on the minimum variance. By choos-
ing the alternatives providing minimum payoff variance, the
risk of achieving a probability of detection substantially
less than the value of the game is minimized. A similar
argument has been advanced about investment portfolios [Ref.
5]. If all portfolios have the same expected return on invest-
ment, the portfolio with the largest variance is the one with
the greatest risk. Conversely the portfolio with the least
variance has the least risk.
If we look at the combinations of strategies in Figure 7,
we can see that searchers ' Strategies 1 and 2 vary the least
with respect to the expected value. Therefore, we may select
the alternative with minimum variance by inspection. The
computations presented in Table 5 confirm this.
One result of modeling the search as a game is that it
allows us to compute the variance as well as the expected
value of the search strategies. The variance computation of
a 2x2 game is described in Appendix A. The variance and
standard deviation for each of the 2x2 subgames in the two
examples is shown in Table 5.
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TABLE 5. VARIANCE AND STANDARD DEVIATION FOR EACH STRATEGY PAIR
Example 1 Example 2
Strategy Pair Variance Std. Dev. Variance Std. Dev.
1-2 .00875 .094 .003841 .062
1-4
.015 .122 .01372 .117
2-3
.02333 .153 .03841 .196
3-4




A. EXTENSION TO MORE SEARCH AREAS
The game approach to searching can be applied to problems
involving three or more search areas and searching units.
At this point the combinations of ways to search become very
large. For example, if there are two search units and three
areas to search, we can count nine ways to put the two
searchers in the three areas and thus nine pure strategies
9for the searcher. This would lead to (-) = 84 3x3 games to
-i
analyze.
One simple example is where one searching unit looks for
one evader in one of three different regions. This is similar
to trying to pick the walnut shell that has the pea hidden
under it. Of course if you pick the right shell (search area)
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the probability of detection is 1.0. The payoff matrix for













o o p 33
Using the method in Epstein [Ref. 6] for finding optimal
strategies of NxN games, we find
P P22 33
P(E,) = P(S,)1 1 P P +P P +P P '
*11 *2 2 ^22 33 F 33 11
P P11 33
P(E„) = P(SJ
Pll ? 22 + P 22 P 33
+ P 33 P ll
D p
] 1 2^P(EJ = P(S,)
-\l r ^V p p 4-P p +P P '




and V = p p -*- p p +P P









) = P(E.) = 1/3, i = 1,2,3, j = 1,2,3,
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2then the value of the game = P/3, the variance = p /3,
and the standard deviation = P//3.
The searcher and evader would play each of their strate-
gies with probability 1/3 and achieve a probability of detec-
tion (payoff) equal to 1/3 of what it would be in any of the
three areas.
If P = 1 (the shell game) then
Probability of Finding Pea = 1/3
,
Variance of Probability = 1/3
t
Standard Deviation = 1//3
, and
Value of Game ± Standard Deviation = 1/3 ± 1//3.
We have analyzed search problems involving stationary evaders
using game theory. It is possible to expand beyond 2x2 games
but the potential combinations of strategies grow very quickly
Next we will address searching for a moving target which we
will model with random search. We will continue to use




The concept of random search was introduced by B. Koopman
in 1946 [Ref. 1]. In random search, the evader may move into
an area already covered by the searcher. Therefore, even if
the searcher covers the area exhaustively, he may not find
the evader. By repeatedly covering the area, the POD then
goes asymptotically to 1.0. This model for the POD is the
exponential
POD = 1 - e"a/A
,
where:
a = Area swept by search unit, and
A = Area in which evader is operating.
The PCD always increases with increasing coverage in the
random search model. Random search always gives a smaller
value for the probability of detection than the ratio of areas
model, as shown in Table 6.
The next step in the development of the search problem is
to allow random search in our previously developed examples.
The evader is now free to move within the partitioned area
that he has chosen, but is not allowed to cross the partition
between A, and A„ . We continue to model the problem with the
four searcher strategies previously described. The entries
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TABLE 6. DETECTION PROBABILITY COMPARISON




2.0 1 .8647 1.0000
in the payoff matrix are now the probabilities of detection
using random search. The arguments of the POD are the a. and



























S, 1-e x /A,





"In the ratio of areas model, once the area is covered,
the POD = 1.0. Additional coverage is redundant.
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Example 1 . When we use the previous values, a, = 15, a~ = 5,
A-, = 60 and A
2
= 40, we obtain:
x
1-e- 1/ 4 1-e- 1/ 8 S. .22120 .11750
S
2













Example 2 . Similarly, we use the values a, =60, a- = 40
,
A, = 150, and A~ = 120 to obtain:
E.





















It is useful to consider some other examples using random
search where the coverage factor is greater than 1.0. The





will be chosen to give coverage
factors greater than 1.0.
Example 3 . A = 500; A, = 400; A~ = 100
a = 300; a, = 200; a
2
= 100





























Note here the strong coverage of A2








































1-e- 4/ 3 s
4
.73640
We next address all the 2x2 subgames in each example and
compute the value of the game, the variance and the standard
deviation. In Example 3, the Sj_ S
4
game now has a saddle-
point since the hierarchy of the elements within the payoff
matrix have changed. The data is presented in Table 7.
We see that the random search results are different than
the area search results. The expected value of the probability
of detection in Examples 1 and 2 is lower as expected.
According to game theory, we would choose the pair of search
strategies which yield the largest expected value. In all
cases this is the S,-S 2 pair. Further, we can see that this
pair of strategies has the smallest variance. We also see
that the diminishing returns effect of random search produces
lower expected payoff in the more extreme search patterns.
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TABLE 7: EXPECTED VALUE AND STANDARD
DEVIATION FOR RANDOM SEARCH EXAMPLES
A=100; a=20 A=270; a= 100 A= 500; a= 300 A= 500; a=200
A = 60; a=15 A= 150; a= 60 A=400; a=200 A= 350; a=150
A= 40; a= 5 A= 120; a= 40 A=100; a= 100 A= 150; a= 50
Example 1 Example 2 Example 3 Example 4
Strategy
Pair Val. Std. Dev. Val. Std. Dev. Val. Std. Dev. Val. Std. Dev.
S-,-S
2
.11767 .07667 .30819 .04281 .43525 .13486 .32370 .08756





.17172 .12552 .29638 .13589 .38957 .25611 .29450 .21801
S
3




The game theory approach to modeling search is useful
when one wants to gain more information about the problem
than the probability of detection. If each alternative
yields the same expected value, the choice among alternatives
would be based upon minimum variance. The alternative that
yields the largest expected values would be chosen by the
searcher, if the expected values were all different. In some
particular applications it may even be desirable to select
the alternative with the largest variance or some function
of the expected value and variance. The user can learn more
about the potential outcomes of his problem by examining the
results of the game model. He now has the variance available
to further describe the outcome. He would use the area ratio
or random search model (whichever was applicable) for the
probability of detection.
An interesting area for future work is relating the ex-
pected value predicted by game theory to the probability
of detection determined by experiment, since experiments
that are expensive or physical situations that occur infre-
quently don't allow for many repetitions.
In a game situation the outcome is determined by the
strategies chosen by each player. It would be interesting
to know the relationship between the outcome of the game and
the variance and the probability distributions of each player
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and their variances, and the number of times that the game
is played.
It is hoped that this approach to search using game
theory is useful to those in the operations research com-





In this appendix, we will develop the optimal probabili-
ties for the searcher and evader when they play the game
according to the minimax theorem. We will also compute the
value of the game when each player uses these optimal
probabilities to select his strategy.
The payoff matrix by convention is the payoff of the
column player to the row player. Since the probability of
detection is a positive payoff to the searcher, we will make
the searcher the row player and the evader the column player.
Another common convention is to call the row player Blue and
the column player Red. We will use the terminology of the
problem, searcher and evader.
A zero sum game represents an exchange between two players
Whatever the column player considers to be detrimental, the
row player considers to be beneficial and vice versa. If the
payoff matrix represents a physical exchange (of money, for
example) the term zero-sum is clear. In our case the proba-
bility of detection of the evader may be considered a loss
to the evader and a gain to the searcher.
The searcher and evader play the game according to the
minimax theorem. This says that the row player, the searcher,
selects his strategies to maximize the minimum expected pay-
off. The column player, the evader, selects his strategies
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to minimize the maximum expected loss. These two expected
values are called the lower and upper value of the game.
The mix of strategies that maximizes the minimum expected
gain for the row player is called the optimal mix of strate-
gies. This assures that he will gain at least the lower value
of the game. A similar argument for the column player says
that his optimal mix strategies would assure him of a loss no
greater than the upper value of the game. One of the elegant
features of game theory is that when both players select
their strategies optimally that the upper and lower value of
the game are equal. This is then simply called the value of
the game. The value of the game is the expected value of
the probability of detection when the searcher and the evader
randomly select from their optimal strategies.
A game with a saddlepoint occurs when the minimum of the
column maximums is equal to the maximum of the row minimums.
Games with saddlepoints are played in only one way. The row
player and column player each select the same strategy for
every play of the game. The payoff will be the same after
every play. A game should be checked for a saddlepoint since
the optimal strategies and the value of the game formulas
(that we will develop next) do not apply if a saddlepoint
exists. The optimal strategies of the searcher and evader




















are the evaders' strategies;
S-, and S
2
are the searchers' strategies; and
P. . is the payoff by the evader to the searcher when
-
1 the searcher chooses strategy i and the evader
chooses strategy j
.
If no saddlepoint exists, the two largest elements in a
2x2 game will be a diagonal of the payoff matrix.
Let P, , P- 2 > P., 2 P 2l* The PaY°f f maY be graphed
(Figure 8) as a function of the mix of strategies. The
maximum expected loss by the evader is shown by the darkened
upper line segments. Since the evader plays to minimize the
maximum expected payoff, he would play at the point where the
two upper lines intersect. This means that he would play
strategies E, and E 2 with probabilities 1-Y and Y as shown
in Figure 8.
To solve for Y we equate both lines at the intersection






Figure 8. Graphically Solving for
the Evader's Strategies
P 21
+ (P22- P21)Y " P ll * (P11- P12 )Y < A
" 2 >
Solving for Y and 1-Y yields
Y =
1-Y =
P - ?11 21
p . p _ p + p '
*11 12 21 22
p _ p
22 12
P — P — P 4- P
*11 12 21 22
(A-3)
The evader will now select his strategy randomly from E,
and E
2








Figure 9. Hraphically Solving for
the Searcher's Strategies
The solution for the searchers' probabilities distribution
is analogous. The payoff is plotted as a function of the
percent of the searchers' strategies in Figure 9 above. Since
the searcher is playing to maximize the minimum payoof, he
is solving the graph from the bottom up (vice the evaders' top
down) . The searcher operates at the intersection of the two
lines. This is the maximum of the minimum expected payoff.
We solve for the probabilities of the searchers ' strategies






p -p -p +p '
11 12 r21 22
(A-4)
P - P
1-X = 22 21
P ll P 12 " P 21 + P 22
where:
1-X = Probability of playing S, , and
X = Probability of playing S-.
The value of the game, V, is the expected value which is
determined from the following equation.
V = (1-X) (l-Y)P
i;L
+ (1-X)YP12 + X(1-Y)P 21 + XYP 22 (A-5)
This reduces to
p p _ p p11 22 *12 r 21 ,_ e ,v =
p r-p r-p ^-p— ^ A- 6 ^rll r12 ^21 22
The payoff matrix fully describes a game. The value of the
game and the probabilities of each strategy are a function
of the payoff matrix.
Variance of a Game
A convenient computation form for the variance of a
quantity X is
Var(X) = E(X2 ) - E(X) 2
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We simply compute each of the quantities on the right
hand side of the equation and subtract. The game G is des-












and S-, / S 2 , E. and E- are the optimal strategies of the
searcher and evader.
E(G2 ) = S1E1P^ 1 + S-^P
2
.,
+ SjEjPJ; + S 2E 2P
2
2




P11 + S lE2 P 12 + S 2E lP21 + S 2E 2 P 22 )
2
The variance then is the difference between these two
quantities, i.e.,
























































S = a~' ^
=
Ay and ° = a^














It is more convenient to work with this general matrix.
We now arbitrarily choose a, 3/ Y and 6 according to the





We see in Figure 10 that there are six intersections of the
four strategies. This is the general form of the 4x2 game.
This would indicate that the evader would solve the game from
the top down and choose strategies S-, and S.. But because
of the partitioning of the search area and searching effort
and the definition of a, 3/ y and 6, this is not strictly
correct. We will not solve all possible 2x2 games and show
that the lines all intersect at a common point because of the
definition of a, 3, y and 5.
We will use the paired notation ij to indicate which pair
of the searcher's strategies we are considering. All possible
2x2 games are shown below. We find the row minimum and column





































































We see that games 13 and 24 have saddlepoints . Next, all
six games are plotted in Figure 11 as a function of the
searchers strategies. The operating points (or solutions)
for the searcher are shown by the heavy dots. The individual
games for the evader may be culled from Figure 1 by taking
all six possible pairs of searcher's strategies. For the
case where a = a, /A,
, 3 = a 2/A 2 , etc., we will show that the
lines all intersect at the same point.
We will solve all six games for the optimal strategies of
the searcher and the evader and the resulting value of the
game. We will use the following notation:
Vv . = Value of the game using searchers strategies
ID i and j , and
E -1 = Fraction of evaders strategy K played




i = 1 to 4 , i j















m = Evader or Searcher,
K 1, 2.
We will solve the value of the game for both the searcher
and the evader against S-, S-:
S„ = 8 " S -r . S.
"Y + 5




S + 6 E12 - a " Y
'1 a - 6 - y + <5 ' 2 a-S-Y + 5
VE = VS s _ a5 -_1y_12 ~ v 12 v 14 a - 3 - Y + 5 *
Against S-.S-,. there is a saddlepoint game with value 3
Against S-jS,,




a + o 1 a + 6 '
e" = -i-r e 14
'1 a + o 2 a + 5
V
s
= V = v = a(B + 5)14 v 14 14 a + 5
Against S-S.,,
-y + Q g + y
a






g T7 23 - _«n ~ a + 6 h 2
23 23 v 23 a + 6
Against S-S., there is a saddlepoint game with value y




4 a+3+Y + <5 3 a + 3 + y + & '
E
34 = 3+6 £ 34 _ a + y
'1 a + 8 + Y + 6 2 a + 3+Y+5'
Vs \tS \t (a + y) (3 + 5)
34 v 34 v 34 a + 3 + Y + 5
In general, the evaders strategies E^ are not the same for
arbitrary a, 3, y and o obeying the hierarchy. But when

















Similarly if we substitute the value of the game we see
that V, ~ = V, , = V n , = V,. . This means that the game12 14 23 34
strategies all intersect at the same point, as in Figure 6.






There are four independent quantities that describe the
search problem with two searching units and an operating area













The searcher's strategies S, and S^ played against the
evaders strategies E-, and E
2








The searcher's strategies S^ and S
4
played against the evader's
strategies E, and E
2












Strategies S-> and S, may be expressed as a linear sum of
strategies S, and S
2
as follows:
5 (a+y) -3 (a+y) a 8 a+y (
a6-3y
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